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Abstract 
In September 2013, civilian contractor Aaron Alexis entered the Washington Navy Yard and murdered twelve people 
before being fatally shot by police. This incident, together with an incident three months earlier involving Edward 
Snowden, caused the U.S. government to critically examine their background investigation (BI) process; because both 
Snowden and Alexis had supposedly slipped through the cracks of their investigations, there must be some flaw in the 
BI procedure. The U.S. Committee on Oversight and Reform concluded that rules forbidding “background checkers from 
looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks” was one of the main factors contributing to defective 
BIs (Report, 2014). Since the report’s release, the Director of National Intelligence has been debating and trialing 
whether information from the Internet should be used to form a data double for BIs (Kopp, 2014; Rockwell, 2014). Us-
ing this conversation as a discussion catalyst, I argue that due to the nature of the data double, if the United States 
were to adopt the use of social networking sites (SNSs) for security clearance purposes, neglecting to take into account 
basic principles of SNSs into the process of BIs may lead to misinformation and unfavorable adjudication. Ultimately, 
being literate about the social practices involved in SNSs and surveillance would benefit not only investigators, but any-
one, including academics, looking at individuals in online spaces. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2013 after government contractors Edward Snow-
den and Aaron Alexis used their security clearances for 
purposes other than the government intended (Snow-
den leaked classified information and Alexis gained ac-
cess to a secured facility where he then murdered 
twelve people), the U.S. government began to question 
the BI process that allowed both to be in cleared posi-
tions with access to protected information and pro-
tected places. According to a letter in November 2013 
from U.S. Representative Darrell Issa, Chairman of the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Issa 
demanded, due to the problems caused by Alexis and 
Snowden, that the agency which conducted both of the 
BIs, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
should release “detailed information about the policies 
and process” that Alexis and Snowden went through 
for their clearances (Issa, 2013, p. 1). Issa believed that 
by examining these processes, problems with BI would 
emerge.  
While Snowden became a catalyst for the proce-
dure review, Alexis’ case became the model of what 
was wrong with the entire process. After months of in-
vestigation on these practices, in February 2014, the 
Committee came out with a report detailing three ma-
jor flaws to the BI procedure. The first was lack of co-
operation from police departments. The second was 
lack of continuous monitoring. Third, “[r]egulations 
prohibit background checkers from looking at the In-
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ternet or social media when performing checks” (Re-
port, 2014). Each “flaw” reportedly contributed to, at 
least in Alexis’ case, “slipping through the cracks.” Even 
though this report was a case study of Alexis, is has be-
come a guideline for what needs to be changed in the 
industry. 
While each of these points merits additional con-
versation, the third point is the focus of this paper. The 
full House report called “Slipping Through the Cracks: 
How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the 
Federal Security Clearance Process” details that OPM’s 
Handbook has not changed since July 2007, and since 
that time, Google searches and social media sites such 
as Twitter and Facebook have become very popular. 
According to the committee, “These three social media 
and search sites, among others, contain a treasure 
trove of information about their users” (H. Rep., 2014, 
p. 36). The report goes on to say how unfortunate it is 
that the handbook denies investigators the ability to 
use the Internet for anything other than minimal in-
formation such as looking up business addresses. The 
document concludes that “[t]his restrictive policy 
keeps nearly every piece of information on a Subject’s 
social networking site outside the reach of security 
clearance investigators” (p. 36), and the report rec-
ommends updated policies which “would allow federal 
investigators to pull information about Subjects from 
of [sic] these and other websites” (p. 37). Merton Mil-
ler, the Associate Director of OPM, addressed these 
criticisms and confirmed the agency was already work-
ing to include use of the Internet in investigations, and 
that appropriate legislation would iron out access to 
the sites and verification of the information from the 
sites. The rationalization is that the sites would assist in 
forming “a more complete picture of the Subjects un-
der consideration for a security clearance than current-
ly exists today” (p. 38). This complete picture, or data 
double, would then be sorted for the purpose of grant-
ing or denying the clearance.  
Incorporating social media into a BI may seem like a 
logical step in keeping up with a candidate considering 
the private sector often utilizes some type of social 
media review (i.e., “Social Intelligence Corp,” n.d.). Not 
everyone agrees with this move though, and the gov-
ernment’s use of this information is being debated be-
tween agencies. While some government officials such 
as those in the U.S. House’s Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform think information from SNSs 
is a treasure trove of information, others, such as Mil-
ler are more cautious about the validity of that infor-
mation. This tension highlights an interesting area of 
study for those interested in issues of surveillance. 
Largely overlooked in surveillance studies, the area of 
BIs provide a vital illustration for understanding the in-
tersection of surveillance, social media, and policies 
that could pave the way for additional uses of personal 
information. By examining the nature of data doubles 
and SNSs, this paper concludes that social media litera-
cy is needed when incorporating SNS data into a data 
double for the purpose of a security clearance. Other-
wise, information presented in a data double may be 
misinterpreted to the detriment of the subject under 
investigation.  
2. Data Doubles and the BI 
For the BI, the sorting of applicants into either a clear-
ance grant or denial comes down to a data double. Ac-
cording to Haggerty and Ericson (2000), data doubles 
are essentially deconstructed bodies which are frag-
mented into components and reassembled to form a 
kind of virtual self to be used for surveillance. Haggerty 
and Ericson comment that the observed body is “[f]irst 
it is broken down by being abstracted from its territori-
al setting. It is then reassembled in different settings 
through a series of data flows. The result is a decorpo-
realized body, a ‘data double’ of pure virtuality” (p. 
611). The body thus gets taken apart and analyzed in 
different places by different methods; it is removed 
from its original setting, and it is then brought together 
again and a newly-formed way. It is no longer the body 
of the individual, but it contains information from that 
original body. The rhetoric of the data double is de-
scribed in power, among many things, as shifting (Lyon, 
2007, p. 114), moving freely into new representations 
(Gilliom & Monahan, 2013, p. 22), circulating and un-
known (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 613), transcend-
ent, and “comprised of pure information” (p. 614). The 
data double becomes another version of the self which 
is fluidly reassembled in different ways by different 
people in different places for different purposes. 
By creating this investigative file, the U.S. govern-
ment is basically creating their version of a data double 
for surveillance purposes. Currently, in order to obtain 
a security clearance or be deemed suitable for a spe-
cially designated position of public trust or national se-
curity, an individual must first go through the BI pro-
cess. Applicants either fill out the December 2010 SF-
86 form which is used to conduct BIs for national secu-
rity positions (U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
[USOPM] “Questionnaire for National Security Posi-
tions,” n.d.), or applicants fill out the September 1995 
SF-85P form which is used for public trust positions 
(U.S. General Services Administration, n.d.). As of 2015, 
ninety percent of the US government’s background in-
vestigations are conducted by OPM, and these investi-
gations span over one hundred federal agencies 
(USOPM, “Background Investigations,” n.d.).  
The content of the SF-86 form asks for basic identi-
fiers such as name, date of birth, place of birth, social 
security number, telephone numbers and email ad-
dress (USOPM, “Questionnaire for National Security 
Positions,” n.d.). Candidates also must fill out addition-
al basic background information for the past ten years 
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such as their residences, education and employment 
histories. The form also asks for foreign travel and for-
eign associates, criminal history, credit information, 
mental health history, any history of alcohol or drug 
abuse, and associations with questionable organiza-
tions. The SF-85P asks similar, but fewer questions and 
often reduces the time accounted for to seven years 
(USOPM “Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions,” 
n.d.). According to the SF-86 and SF-85P forms, the in-
formation gathered from these forms serve a basis for 
the subsequent background investigation, and the re-
sults of this investigation are used for adjudication 
purposes. The information obtained from the investi-
gation process is then compiled in this investigative 
file, and the assembled content is intended to provide 
“the full universe of information the adjudicators can 
consider” (H. Rep., 2014, p. 8). This report is forwarded 
to an adjudicator who reviews only this investigative 
file. These investigations are adjudicated based, among 
many things, on criteria such as the applicant’s reliabil-
ity, trustworthiness, allegiance to the U.S., foreign in-
fluence and preference, sexual behavior, conduct, fi-
nancial considerations, alcohol and drug use, 
psychological conditions, and use of information tech-
nology systems (“Adjudicative Guidelines,” 2006). Oth-
er points of consideration are criminal conduct, securi-
ty violations, outside activities, and misuse of 
information technology systems (H. Rep., 1999). 
In terms of the investigative file for the BI, the U.S. 
government makes their version of the data double 
when they compile an investigative file on an applicant. 
The data double would be an assemblage of all the in-
formation gathered on the individual for the purpose 
of the investigation. As mentioned in the directions of 
the SF-85P or SF-86, this data double could be com-
prised of any of the required information for the form 
such as name, date or place of birth, residence or em-
ployment history, personal interview, and any subse-
quent information obtained to verify this information.  
If SNS were included, details that a user would pro-
vide on a SNS align nicely with the SF-86 and SF-85P 
forms, especially regarding name, date or birth, city of 
residence, and educational background. Many of these 
elements are asked for and/or volunteered by SNS us-
ers. All of these elements could be compared, corrobo-
rated, or found to be discrepant from information pro-
vided by a subject during an investigation. Other things 
that might be identified on a SNS are things like under-
age drinking (H. Rep., 2014) or friendship with foreign 
nationals (Kopp, 2014). The SNS could be, as the U.S. 
House of Representatives stated, “a treasure trove of 
information about their users” (H. Rep., 2014, p. 36). 
All this information could flow into one investigative 
file as part of a data double.  
The nature of the adjudication process though, 
complicates the use of a data double in a BI. To explain, 
as shown, the adjudicator would not be talking to the 
subject of the investigation him/herself; the adjudica-
tor would just be looking at this investigative file or da-
ta double. This would be an abstracted, decorporeal-
ized body there to be sorted. Depending on what the 
data double was made up of, the adjudicator would 
decide on position suitability, and this person would be 
sorted into a clearance granted or denied position. This 
is problematic though because as Lyon (2007) reports, 
many times an individual may feel that their data dou-
ble “does not accurately represent them” (p. 90). An 
individual may feel that what shows up in investigative 
file may not fully represent, or misrepresents, their life. 
A quick example of the potential problems that the 
data double could lead to in the BI is alluded to in a 
summary report of the flaws involved in Aaron Alexis’ 
investigation. In a press release, the U.S. Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform pointed out that 
over 450 law enforcement departments did not fully 
cooperate with the OPM BI process (Report, 2014). In 
Alexis’ case, the Seattle Police Department did not fully 
divulge information about a gun-related arrest, and 
there was also limited information provided about an 
anger-fueled black-out. While Alexis may have been 
able to get his clearance based on this lack of infor-
mation, it may not go this way for others. For instance, 
if a clearance candidate was arrested by a law en-
forcement agency that did not cooperate with the in-
vestigative process, then incomplete information may 
only be available to an adjudicator, and the adjudicator 
may not be able to see that the arrest information was 
only a minor charge or that charges were dismissed. This 
incomplete information may in fact hurt an applicant. 
While an individual may be able to defend and respond 
to questions from an adjudicator about the charge, a 
decorporalized data double cannot answer back.  
The danger of misinformation is especially true for 
SNSs, and adding SNSs to the BI process could offer fur-
ther complications. While the above police report may 
have some semblance of facts, due to the nature of 
SNSs, information gleaned from these sites may be 
even less-reliable than an incomplete police report. 
People don’t necessarily create SNSs with the intended 
purpose of having the government surveil them or look 
at the data they have posted. Users often expect to be 
watched, but it is most often the thought of social sur-
veillance, or the use of social media to see what 
friends, family, and acquaintances are up to (Marwick, 
2012), which guides their paradigm of observation. As 
a result of this, users don’t always just report the truth 
or facts, and sometimes information is posted just to 
be entertaining. Due to the tone of the site, some users 
can be encouraged or feel comfortable posting infor-
mation that isn’t necessarily true in order to match the 
tone of other site interactions. For instance, according 
to boyd and Ellison (2008), “The extent to which por-
traits are authentic or playful varies across both sites; 
both social and technological forces shape these prac-
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tices” (p. 220). Donath and boyd (2004) provide the ex-
ample of a law professor on Orkut who stated his ca-
reer skills were “small appliance repair” and his career 
interests were “large appliance repair” (p.75). In this 
case, this playful post didn’t seem to be problematic or 
purposefully deceptive, but an outsider without really 
knowing the Subject may misinterpret the information 
as a falsehood if it didn’t match up with other infor-
mation. Misinterpretations like this may end up as a 
permanent record though, in one’s investigative file, on 
the way to adjudication, and because data doubles 
cannot talk back, the usefulness and consequences of 
using this information may be detrimental to the sub-
ject of investigation. If one didn’t list “appliance repair” 
in an employment section, they may appear dishonest. 
This example then brings up the importance of having 
some type of basic understanding, or literacy, of the 
practices involved in SNSs. While knowing these prac-
tices cannot verify information, they can provide an in-
terpretive foundation for those that incorporate SNSs 
in to BIs. 
3. SNS Literacy  
According to Brian Street (1984), literacy is “shorthand 
for the social practices and conceptions of reading and 
writing" (p. 1). Knobel and Lankshear (2008) also add 
that literacies are “socially recognized ways of generat-
ing, communicating and negotiating meaning content” 
(p. 255). Implicit in these definitions is that literacy is 
not just reading and writing, and literacy is not just 
mastering a skill set or competencies. Being literate as-
sumes that one knows the social practices that one en-
gages in while reading and writing. Not taking into ac-
count the practices assumes literacy is neutral and not 
affected by situation; once someone learns to read and 
write, this skill will translate across every platform and 
situation. This is not the case though, as even a reader 
switching between a fiction and non-fiction text would 
have to understand the assumptions or practices each 
genre carries. Readers come to realize that fiction 
books are often meant to entertain rather than inform. 
A more robust and thorough understanding of literacy 
then calls for an expanded model which draws on not 
just skills but on the social practices and assumptions 
surrounding skills and spaces—all of which vary with 
context.  
Taking information from SNSs at face value and in-
corporating this information in BIs/data doubles with-
out any type of discretion or filtering process would be 
an example of failing to understand literacies for SNSs 
in BIs. Because SNSs are involved in social practices, 
one must be literate in the ways different assumptions 
alter and shape the content of SNSs. As previously dis-
cussed, an outsider looking at a SNS for the purposes 
other than social surveillance would already be reading 
SNSs out of context, and not understanding the sites’ 
practices would further complicate any claims of objec-
tivity. The following literacies could be used as guides 
for those analyzing SNSs for the purpose of BIs or any 
other type of analysis of SNSs. Understanding each of 
these literacies would be essential for the federal gov-
ernment or outside researchers when considering in-
cluding SNS information into permanent records.  
The example of Chelsea (then Bradley) Manning’s 
Facebook page will be helpful to understand the appli-
cation of these principles to SNS and BIs. Chelsea Man-
ning was convicted in July 2013 of giving classified doc-
uments to Wikileaks. PBS’s Frontline published an 
annotated version of Manning’s Facebook page from 
the opening of his account in July 2007 to its conclusion 
in June 2010 (“Bradley Manning's Facebook Page,” 
2011). Other than Manning and Manning's ex-
boyfriend Tyler Watkins, the site blurs out those that 
comment and post on the page. All posts listed are also 
those authored only by Manning with the exception of 
the final post on June 5, 2010 which is a post from 
Manning’s aunt, posted under Manning’s name, to let 
his Facebook friends know that he has been arrested. 
Although these posts have been annotated, what is left 
provides more than enough information for a case 
study analysis. Manning will be referred to as “he” 
throughout this analysis because Manning was Bradley 
at the time of the postings.  
4. SNS Literacy and Manning 
The first literacy that would be crucial to have would 
be functional literacy. Functional literacy of SNSs would 
provide a basic foundation of what a SNS even is. Sel-
ber (2004) describes functional literacy as imagining 
technology as a tool and participants as users. Func-
tional literacy has often been described as mastering 
techniques, neutral and decontextualized out of the 
social sphere it exists in. A user that can maneuver 
around and be competent with a computer begins to 
be functionally computer literate. This idea is often 
seen in late 1990’s national programs to get students 
ready for business in the 21st century. For instance, 
Cynthia L. Selfe (1999) shows that Clinton and Gore’s 
1996 Technology Literacy Challenge was essentially 
about teaching students skills on how to use a comput-
er. A student would be literate in technology once they 
became competent and learned a set of finite skills. 
Lankshear and Knobel (2008) use the related term 
“standardized operational definition” (p. 3) and add 
this concept centers around the idea that one is digital-
ly literate by acquiring proficiencies which may include 
tasks, performances, and demonstrations of skills. It in-
volves skills like using a computer, understanding its 
components, and navigating the Internet. For SNSs, 
functional literacy could involve understanding how 
sites are set up and the platform limitations of them 
such as Twitter’s 140 character limitations (while other 
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sites such as Facebook are without these constraints). 
boyd and Ellison (2008) also identified three other 
functional characteristics of SNSs which aren’t specific 
to one platform and tend to permeate the overall pur-
pose of SNSs. The first fundamental element is that 
SNSs are online forums which individuals can create 
online presences (private or semi-private) within the 
constraints of a defined system. Second, SNSs organize 
and present a list of other users on the site which the 
user either knows or may have a connection with. 
Third, more than just aggregating a group of connec-
tions, SNSs also let users look at the profiles of these 
connected individuals. For a SNS review, each of these 
characteristics would help frame the overall analysis. 
The sites are not necessarily geared towards a strict re-
counting of life events; they are often forums to dis-
cuss thoughts with connections (public or private) or to 
view other associations.  
An investigator who was functionally literate of a 
SNS would need to understand the basic functions of 
social media or the basic components of what makes 
up a SNS. While this may be the most basic of litera-
cies, being able to understand the overall site funda-
mentals would be an important skill for several rea-
sons. First, functional literacy would help an 
investigator understand the privacy controls of the site. 
Investigators, depending on what restrictions are 
placed on access to a SNS, would want to know if they 
are able to actually view a page or if they would need 
additional access due to technological restrictions on 
the access to the site. They would have also need to 
understand if they would have access to private mes-
sages or if they are obligated to only see public infor-
mation. Functional literacy of the friends on SNSs 
would entail understanding the ways that someone 
else is allowed to provide content by posting on anoth-
er’s page. If one is friends with another, the friends 
may be allowed to submit messages on someone else’s 
page, and this may vary across platforms. For instance, 
photos shared and tagged through Twitter or Insta-
gram can be shared differently or than those shared 
through Facebook. It would also mean being concerned 
with access to the individual’s friend lists. If an investi-
gator has access to one’s SNS, does that mean they are 
able or should be encouraged to look through the list 
of friends? What would be the limits of looking at re-
lated pages? And, are those friends scrutinized too? 
Functional literacy would help set boundaries on ob-
taining information. 
In Manning’s case, Manning set up this Facebook 
page according to Facebook’s constraints. Investigators 
would have wanted to understand that when Manning 
set up his page, only certain elements can go on that 
page in certain ways. For instance, Manning’s first post 
on July 22, 2007 states, “Just created a new Facebook” 
(“Bradley Manning's Facebook Page,” 2011). Through 
the timeline, Manning posts numerous other general 
comments such as July 27, 2008’s post stating, “Home 
today” or August 6, 2007’s “back home from Lollapa-
looza.” Each post is identified as being Manning’s by 
having his photo and name next to it. Throughout the 
timeline he also posts photos of himself like December 
24, 2007’s photo captioned “Just Me” and URLs such as 
June 28, 2008’s link to Bob Barr’s 2008 campaign. Fa-
cebook places the individual’s name and photo next to 
each post, and it allows content like text, photos and 
hyperlinks.  
Also, it would need to be understood that these are 
Manning’s public posts (or at least public to his 
friends), and while these messages may have been ob-
servable to some or all of Manning’s connections, they 
may not be observable to everyone. Facebook allows 
users to limit the audience of posts from the broad 
public to specific users (“When I post something,” 
2015). Additionally, there is also the messenger func-
tion which allows direct messages between users or 
groups of users. Investigators would need to know 
their information limitations.  
It is important too, to understand that Manning’s 
contacts are also able to contribute to Manning’s page. 
For instance, on February 24, 2009, a redacted individ-
ual posted “Hahahah ah I c” and May 26, 2009 another 
redacted individual posted, “Ditto” (“Bradley Man-
ning's Facebook Page,” 2011). While these posts are 
not seemingly consequential, they do highlight others 
can post on the site, and posts like this bring up the 
question of association. If someone wrote something 
inappropriate, would Manning have been responsible 
for those quotes even if he didn’t agree with them if 
they weren’t deleted? It is also worth noting that Man-
ning’s last entry, according to Frontline, was posted by 
his aunt and read, “Some of you may have heard that I 
have been arrested for disclosure of classified infor-
mation to unauthorized persons…” This also begs the 
question of the authenticity of any of the posts; while it 
may be Manning’s page, Manning may not have been 
the direct poster of the entry if someone else had ac-
cess to the account. 
Overall then, Manning’s site shows that due to the 
system architecture, for an outsider to understand the 
content of SNSs, one such as investigator would want 
to know functional matters like what specific techno-
logical constraints could influence the information that 
is contained on the site. This would matter regarding 
presentation of the site, privacy of the site, and contri-
butions to the site. While this literacy may seem the 
most basic of understandings, it would be important to 
understand these elements even begin to start to deci-
pher the information taken from a SNS.  
A second literacy is rhetorical literacy. Bizzell and 
Herzberg (1990) relay that one understanding of rheto-
ric is “the use of language, written or spoken, to inform 
or persuade” (p. 1). Language is thus used to produce 
spaces in which the orator or writer creates areas of in-
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fluence. According to Rheingold (2012), those posting 
in SNSs such as Facebook or Google+ are such partici-
pants which “seek, adopt, appropriate, and invent 
ways to participate in cultural production” (2012, p. 
19). This participation can be anything from making a 
post to remixing or recreating a popular video. For 
Erstad (2008), being able to participate represents a 
shift in society from spaces that are defined by others 
to places where the audience can take “available con-
tent and create something new, something not prede-
fined” (p. 178). SNSs are places where this rhetorical 
production happens. Users, through the constraints of 
a defined system, are able to create a space of their 
own. Having a rhetorical literacy would then entail ex-
amining the design and evaluation of these online 
spaces with the idea in mind that users are producers 
of their environments. 
Further, these users don’t just produce for them-
selves, and rhetorical production takes place in front of 
spectators. On SNSs, users write in certain ways for 
certain perceived audiences. For SNSs, a list of friends 
on the site can be understood as an audience. The SNS 
audience serves a meaningful function because this 
“public display of connections” (Donath & boyd, 2004, 
p. 72) is essential in helping shape the content of posts. 
Having connections on these sites presents a public for 
the user (Baym & boyd, 2012). The users are no longer 
just interacting with an unknown audience; they are in-
teracting with a specific public where for the most part 
they are aware of the groups’ identities. This imagined 
audience further causes a user to engage in behavioral 
norms (boyd & Ellison, 2008), and based off the users’ 
perceived associations, the user may adapt the mes-
sage they are delivering. This awareness of a public in 
social media also changes how people write (Baym & 
boyd, 2012). When dealing with connections, a person 
may vary what they say due to their imagined audience 
of their connections (boyd & Ellison, 2008). According 
to Donath and boyd (2004), “Knowing that everyone 
they interact with knows of and can communicate with 
a group of their acquaintances can influence their be-
havior” (p. 76). Further, people adjust what they are 
going to say based off of their audience (Baym & boyd, 
2012). When SNS users are creating their profiles and 
constructing their identities, “they must consider how 
they will be received by their intimate publics and also 
how the public telling of their stories might affect their 
loved ones” (p. 324). Because of these tailored mes-
sages, an outsider would thus want to understand the 
values that the site and friends have and their influ-
ence upon the user’s posts. Rhetorical literacy then 
would entail also understanding the intended audience 
of a SNS. 
For Manning and rhetorical literacy, Manning was a 
producer of a site in front of his audience. It was often 
clear that he was writing for groups of friends and 
family. His aunt would have been aware of his site be-
cause she posted his final message, so his aunt was 
among his audience. Additionally, he addressed certain 
groups of people on certain occasions. On December 
17, 2009, Manning states, “Thanks for all the birthday 
wishes at my double deuces” (“Bradley Manning's Fa-
cebook Page,” 2011), and two days later he wrote, 
“[T]hanks everyone for all the goodies. I’ve been get-
ting them! Hope to write everyone.” Earlier in the year 
on July 4, 2009, Manning put the word out that “[Brad-
ley Manning] needs 4th of July plan for D.C. Call me.” 
On December 24, 2008, he “wishes you all a Merry 
Christmas,” and on July 27, 2007, he remixed a Fergie 
song and asked, “[I]’d like y’all to give me some feed-
back.” On other occasions, he singled out Starbucks 
coworkers such as the July 26, 2007 post addressed, 
“STARBUCKS PEEPS.” Each of these points presents 
good examples of Manning addressing specific audi-
ences. Manning did not appear to be posting random 
thoughts for outsiders to peruse; instead, these posts 
seem to be directed towards an audience that he knew 
personally.  
While is impossible to know how Manning’s posts 
were adapted to his audience without a direct conver-
sation with Manning, research does show that the con-
tent of posts are influenced by site practices and the 
audience. Understanding Manning’s audience may be a 
key to understanding where important information is 
for investigators. According to Baym (2010), “Any in-
stance of digital language use depends on the technol-
ogy, the purpose of the interaction, the norms of the 
group, the communication style of the speaker's social 
groups offline, and the idiosyncrasies of individuals” (p. 
65). Thus, people write in certain ways through specific 
technologies for certain audiences. The postings then 
are not acontextual occurrences. People are aware that 
others are looking at them and may “feel pressured to 
conform to those groups’ norms” (p. 81). It is thus in-
teresting then to consider why Manning gave infor-
mation to Wikileaks and also, according to Frontline, 
was reprimanded by the Army “for revealing sensitive 
information in video messages to his friends and family 
posted on YouTube” (“Bradley Manning's Facebook 
Page,” 2011), but he did not do the same on Facebook. 
Audience awareness then would help signal where 
possibly more telling information would be divulged. 
For some reason, Manning was more motivated to 
share sensitive information with his audience on plat-
forms other than Facebook.  
A third literacy would be informational literacy. This 
literacy would be a key skill involved in SNS use for the 
BI. Informational literacy deals with being able to lo-
cate, be critical of, and use information found by digital 
means. Being discerning about information would de-
termine what information was important and should 
be included in one’s data double. For Fieldhouse and 
Nicholas (2008), information literacy draws on using 
critical thinking skills in order to decipher information 
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from multiple, competing sources. Since SNSs often 
provide an overabundance of information, being able 
to decipher that information would be exceptionally 
important. Howard Rheingold’s (2012) idea of crap de-
tection fits well into this understanding of literacy. 
Rheingold outlines that a necessary digital literacy is to 
navigate through the crap that may be present on the 
web in order to find and use the most accurate and 
relevant information. This involves looking at authors, 
identifying publishers, and making sure information is 
corroborated by other sources. Rainie and Wellman 
(2012) touch on the same idea with their idea of skep-
ticism literacy. They encourage that one should be able 
to assess the information from multiple sources in or-
der to “weed out the media and people who have out-
dated, biased, incomplete, and agenda-driven or just 
dead-wrong ideas to pass along” (p. 274). Being cynical 
about the information presented then is essential then 
to SNS surveillance. This literacy asks the viewer (or in 
this case investigator) to use discretion in the infor-
mation obtained on a SNSs.  
For investigators involved with surveilling social 
media, understanding what information is valid is im-
portant. OPM’s Merton Miller begins to explore the 
question of validity in the February Alexis report. Even 
though OPM was cooperating with the US House about 
considering whether to incorporate SNSs into the BIs, 
Miller himself pushed back on the incorporation of this 
information. Although Miller acknowledged that there 
may be value in looking at social media sites to identify 
things such as underage drinking, Miller resisted the 
committee’s unrestrained approval of incorporating 
the information by making the following statement:  
Now, so what is the veracity of that information? 
You wrote it. You posted it. Somebody is going to 
have to determine the reliability of that. So that's 
the hard part, I think, in applying the social media 
role in background investigations. It's not collecting 
it, it's not finding it, it's then doing the analysis, be-
cause when you run an investigation you shouldn't 
be incorporating information that isn't true about 
the subject in that investigation. (H. Rep., 2014, pp. 
37-38, emphasis in original)  
This conversation and Miller’s concerns raise a topic of 
conversation for surveillance studies to explore. While 
much analysis of Miller’s statement can be conducted, 
on the surface, his comments at least start to pull back 
the House’s larger prevailing notion that social media is 
a treasure trove of information about a subject.  
For Manning’s Facebook page, there were several 
things that could have been of interest for his BI. One 
category was the more benign but informational data. 
First there is the list of Manning’s connections. Accord-
ing to the House report, this information could be used 
for lead purposes (H. Rep., 2014). Additionally, Man-
ning provided basic working and living information. For 
instance for employments, on July 24, 2007, Manning 
states, “[Bradley Manning is] working at Starbucks,” 
and on July 27, 2008 he announces, “[Bradley Manning 
is] working at Abercrombie & Fitch.” (“Bradley Man-
ning's Facebook Page,” 2011). For residences, on De-
cember 31, 2007 Manning posts, “[Bradley Manning] is 
going back to Ft. Leonard Wood on Thursday,” and on 
April 4, 2008 he states, “[I]’ve now moved on to Fort 
Huachuca in AZ.” He also lists deployment locations 
such as October 29, 2009’s post, “[Bradley Manning] 
has arrived at destination in Iraq.” Since the security 
forms ask for employments and residences, Manning’s 
mentioning of both could be used to corroborate in-
formation he listed on his paperwork. 
Second, there was also other, possibly more derog-
atory information that could be found. For instance, 
Manning alludes to problems at employments. On No-
vember 5, 2007, Manning posts, “[Bradley Manning] is 
still in the Army, but suspended with injuries from 
Basic Training.” Although it was for medical reasons, 
Manning still relays that he was suspended from the 
Army. He alludes to other employment problems, resi-
dence problems, and the feeling of living a double life 
in a November 17, 2008 entry. On this day, Manning 
posts a link to a news story and states, “I got an anon-
ymous mention in this article. How fun!” The article 
links to an article on Syracuse.com in which an anony-
mous soldier (identified as Manning by Frontline) re-
veals, “I was kicked out of my home and I once lost my 
job,” and also, due to the Army’s don’t ask, don’t tell 
policy, “"I've been living a double life….I can't make a 
statement. I can't be caught in an act” (Her, 2008). 
Along these lines, many of Manning’s posts openly 
speak of homosexual relationships which were not al-
lowed at the Army at the time. For instance, in Decem-
ber 2008, Manning updated his Facebook page to an-
nounce, “Bradley is in an open relationship with Tyler 
Watkins.” (“Bradley Manning's Facebook Page,” 2011). 
While not problematic now, at the time it was against 
military policy. It bothered Manning enough that he 
admitted under the condition of anonymity that it 
caused him to feel like he was living a double life. 
Manning also spoke of his desired use of alcohol, and 
on his twenty-first birthday on December 17, 2008, he 
states, “[Bradley Manning] wants to get out of upstate, 
hit the clubs and get wasted as soon as possible!” Oth-
er statements which could be interpreted as questions 
of mental health were Manning’s more dispirited-
sounding posts. For instance, on May 5, 2010, he post-
ed, “[Bradley Manning] is beyond frustrated with peo-
ple and society at large.” On April 30, 2010 he posted, 
“[Bradley Manning] is now left with the sinking feeling 
that he doesn’t have anything left…” On March 10, 
2009, he states, “[Bradley Manning] feels ignored by 
society.” Each of these posts may lead some to believe 
Manning was feeling less than happy with life.  
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In order to determine the relevancy of any of these 
postings, some sort of established standards on infor-
mation would be needed. While many of these dis-
cussed points may have been of interest to corroborate 
off Manning’s security application or bring up ques-
tions of character, it is questionable if these would 
have flagged him as being a national security threat. If 
these elements were not on his form, he could have 
been flagged as being dishonest, but dishonesty re-
garding few things does not necessarily equate to di-
vulging classified information. In light of functional and 
rhetorical literacies, too, the content of these posts are 
often influenced by external factors like the constraints 
of the site or the audience one is addressing. Just be-
cause Manning felt “frustrated with people and society 
at large,” that doesn’t meant that Manning would go-
ing to commit a heinous act; oftentimes people uses 
SNSs to interact with peers and receive feedback 
(Pempek, Yermolayeva, & Calvert, 2009) or for emo-
tional support in times of stress (Baym, 2010). Infor-
mation literacy then would be important when under-
standing what information is true, important and 
accurate and what information may be less consequen-
tial to a BI. 
5. Discussion 
The points at which humans make assumptions or 
submit “data” is an important place to analyze. In Sci-
ence in Action, Latour (1987) encourages attention not 
necessarily be paid to the final product of scientific re-
search, but instead, attention should be made in the 
negotiation of the process of production. Latour refers 
to the finished product as a black-box, a place where 
practices and assumptions are taken as given. Im-
portant to him instead is to look at the places where 
meaning-making is inscribed before the black-box is 
closed. Similarly, for those studying surveillance of 
SNSs, the practices involved in meaning- making then 
would be important points to examine.  
As shown, when dealing with SNSs for surveillance, 
meaning occurs before an investigator even draws 
conclusions. Those posting in SNSs are engaged in prac-
tices that influence the production and outcome of 
their “completed,” black-box profiles/investigative 
files/data doubles. These influences imbedded in these 
final products would in turn be more solidified as in in-
vestigator uses that black-box profile for their own 
analyses-turn-black-box investigative file. The adjudica-
tor would further add their interpretation on the re-
port for the determination of a clearance. Each point of 
scrutiny further inscribes more meaning.  
This is especially true for any outsider (i.e., one who 
knows little background information about the Sub-
ject). Without knowing the exact meaning of posts, an 
outsider doing a content analysis of a SNS may not un-
derstand the practices an SNS user is engaged in. Re-
search shows that most users are on SNSs to maintain 
already existing contacts (boyd & Ellison, 2008). A peer 
then would, for the most part, be someone that had a 
least a little context of who was being examined. An in-
vestigator or any other outsider, however, would be 
someone with little or no prior knowledge of the Sub-
ject or associations. This lack of context positions the 
outsider as an agent of surveillance compiling infor-
mation about a Subject based on minimal, if any, per-
spective on the Subject other than the SNS profiles 
themselves. For investigations, this outsider status may 
even be favored; for instance, the idea of an impartial 
outside observer without close personal ties to a sub-
ject of investigation is usually the preferred construct. 
Just the term conflict of interest in law enforcement 
would imply an unwanted situation. In reality though, 
this lack of context may actually make it harder to 
identify the veracity of the information presented.  
This lack of perspective for SNS may make achieving 
SNS objectivity in a BI difficult, problematic, and possi-
bly with lasting consequences. In the context of BI’s, 
surveillance information from SNSs could be solidified 
into the data double and used for sorting. This could all 
be based off of information that is influenced by social 
practice and needs to be verified and validated. The 
ramifications of not getting a clearance are strong, and 
a denial just one time may jeopardize an individual 
from future employment; question 25.2 on the SF-86 
form asks if one has been denied a clearance (USOPM, 
“Questionnaire for National Security Positions,” n.d.). 
Ultimately, then, any assumptions about SNS infor-
mation based on a content analysis may be less than 
accurate. However, as Bowker and Star (1999) remind 
us, though, validity does not always matter. They state, 
“Equally, as good pragmatists, we know that things 
perceived as real are real in their consequences” (p. 
53). The data double, full of investigative information, 
could come to be more real than the actual individual 
under consideration for a clearance. This is why a basic 
understanding of SNS literacies would be essential to 
even begin to use SNSs in BIs. 
6. Conclusion 
Civilian and government agencies use and contemplate 
using social media assemblages as part of their version 
of a data double. Looking at the nature of social media 
through a literacies lens shows though that many times 
the individual in control of a SNS profile manipulates 
that profile due to the constraints and norms of the 
communities they are part of. While this does not nec-
essarily mean social media profiles are deceptive, it 
does make one question the incorporation of SNSs into 
the BI process which would have real consequences for 
those denied a position due to information on a SNS. 
Due to the importance of these ramifications, it would 
be beneficial then for those doing surveillance to have 
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a solid understanding, or literacy, of the functional 
matters of what social media is comprised of, the prac-
tices it engages in, what is created and for whom, and 
how users and investigators shape interpretations of 
social media profiles. Beyond the BI, this would be im-
portant for any outsider trying to surveil SNSs for any 
purpose. Even academics using SNSs as spaces of study 
would want to be literate of these sites.  
While this paper raised the need for literacies, it did 
not go into more specific criteria could be used. Fur-
ther research into appropriate and relevant criteria 
would need to be conducted. The conclusions of this 
paper lead to a desire for more analysis of ethical con-
siderations and of what policies should be used for ex-
amining a SNS for the purpose of the BI data double. 
Not understanding social network limitations ultimate-
ly may affect the sorting of profiles and eventual ac-
ceptance of employment, and as SNSs grow in popular-
ity, these questions only become more important. 
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